Using Individual-Level Randomized Treatment to Learn about Market Structure?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Casaburi, Lorenzo; Reed, Tristan
• 署名单位: University of Zurich; The World Bank
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20200306
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 58-90
• 关键词: trade credit; imperfect competition; Agricultural markets; demand; provision; middlemen; FIRMS

摘要

Interference across competing firms in RCTs can be informative about market structure. An experiment that subsidizes a random subthis idea. Interpreting treatment-control differences in prices and quantities purchased from farmers through a model of Cournot competition reveals differentiation between traders is low. Combining this result with quasi-experimental variation in world prices shows that the number of traders competing is 50 percent higher than the number operating in a village. Own-price and cross-price supply elasticities are high. Farmers face a competitive market in this first