The Impact of Benefit Generosity on Workers' Compensation Claims: Evidence and Implications

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cabral, Marika; Dillender, Marcus
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; National Bureau of Economic Research; Vanderbilt University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20220032
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 436-481
• 关键词: Moral hazard; unemployment benefits; insurance receipt; disability rolls; medical costs; duration; injury

摘要

Leveraging unique administrative data and a sharp increase in benefit generosity in a difference-in-differences research design, we estimate the impact of workers' compensation wage replacement benefits on individual behavior and program costs. We find that and increased medical spending. Responses along these two margins are equally important drivers of increased program costs, collectively increasing program costs 1.4 times the mechanical increase in costs. Using these estimates and an estimate of the consumption drop among injured workers, our welfare calibrations suggest that a marginal increase in benefit generosity would not improve welfare.