Consumer Protection in an Online World: An Analysis of Occupational Licensing t

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Farronato, Chiara; Fradkin, Andrey; Larsen, Bradley J.; Brynjolfsson, Erik
• 署名单位: Harvard University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; National Bureau of Economic Research; Boston University; Washington University (WUSTL); Stanford University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20210716
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 549-579
• 关键词: Reputation; restrictions; aggregation; QUALITY; sales

摘要

We study the demand and supply implications of occupational licensing using transaction -level data from a large online platform for home improvement services. We find that demand is more responsive to a professional's reviews than to the professional's platform -verified licensing status. We show some evidence that consumers view licenses and reviews as substitutes. We confirm the generality of our findings off the platform in an independent consumer survey. Combining state -level licensing regulation data with platform microdata , we find that more stringent requirements are associated with less competition , higher prices , and no increase in demand or consumer satisfaction. ( JEL D18, J44, L74, L84 )