Public Information Is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Electionst

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Banerjee, Abhijit; Enevoldsen, Nils; Pande, Rohini; Walton, Michael
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Yale University; Yale University; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20220088
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 323-353
• 关键词: field experiment; media; responsiveness; clientelism; malfeasance; audits

摘要

Two years prior to elections , two-thirds of Delhi municipal councillors learned they had been randomly chosen for a preelection newspaper report card. Treated councillors in high -slum areas increased pro -poor spending , relative both to control counterparts and treated counterparts from low -slum areas. Treated incumbents ineligible to rerun in home wards because of randomly assigned gender quotas were substantially likelier to run elsewhere only if their report card showed a strong pro -poor spending record. Parties also benefited electorally from councillors' high pro -poor spending. In contrast , in a cross -cut experiment , councillors did not react to actionable information that was not publicly disclosed. ( JEL D72, D83, H75, J16, O15, O17, O18 )