When Individual Politics Become Public: Do Civil Service Protections Insulate Government Workers?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Foy, Morgan
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20220723
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 292-322
• 关键词: performance pay; patronage; sector; bureaucracy; incentives

摘要

This paper examines whether the civil service system protected state bureaucrats from political interference following a recall petition against the governor of Wisconsin. I find that most classified workers , who were covered by the state civil service laws , were paid equally by signing status following the public disclosure of the petition list. Conversely , signers in the unclassified service , a smaller set of government positions , were paid about 3 percent less annually relative to nonsigners in the postdisclosure period. These results indicate that the civil service insulated qualified bureaucrats , while uncovered workers faced retribution. ( JEL D72, D73, H75, H83, J31, J45 )