Civil Service Exams and Organizational Performance: Evidence from the Pendleton Act

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Moreira, Diana; Perez, Santiago
• 署名单位: National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Davis; University of California System; University of California Davis; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20220284
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 250-291
• 关键词: financial incentives; patronage; bureaucracy; merit; management; immigrants; CORRUPTION; mobility; GROWTH; matter

摘要

We use newly digitized data to study the impacts of a historical reform that mandated exams for some employees in the largest US customs -collection districts. Although the reform improved targeted employees' professional backgrounds and reduced turnover , it did not lead to significant improvements in the cost-effectiveness of customs revenue collection. The incomplete reach of the reform was key for this partial success. First , the reform incentivized hiring in exam -exempted positions , distorting districts' hierarchical structure. Second , since we find suggestive evidence that districts' top managers mattered for performance , not changing their appointment method might have constituted a missed opportunity for improvement.