The Impacts of Physician Payments on Patient Access, Use, and Health

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Alexander, Diane; Schnell, Molly
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20210227
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 142-177
• 关键词: affordable care act; medicaid fees; appointment availability; financial incentives; school absenteeism; insurance-coverage; student absences; PARTICIPATION; reimbursement; BEHAVIOR

摘要

We examine how supply-side health insurance generosity affects patient access, use, and health. Exploiting large, exogenous changes in Medicaid reimbursement rates for physicians, we find that increasing payments for new patient office visits reduces reports of providers turning away beneficiaries: closing the gap in payments between Medicaid and private insurers would reduce more than half of disparities in access among adults and would eliminate such disparities among children. We further find that higher physician reimbursement leads to more office visits, better self -reported health, and reduced school absenteeism among the program's beneficiaries.