Fiscal Rules and the Sovereign Default Premiumt

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hatchondo, Juan Carlos; Martinez, Leonardo; Roch, Francisco
• 署名单位: International Monetary Fund
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MACROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7707
• DOI: 10.1257/mac.20170479
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 244-273
• 关键词: interest-rates; debt; STABILITY; MODEL; institutions; DISCRETION; crises; POLICY; COSTS; RISK

摘要

We study fiscal rules using a sovereign default model. A debt-brake (spread-brake) rule imposes a ceiling on the fiscal deficit when the sovereign debt (spread) is above a threshold. For our benchmark cali-bration, similar gains can be achieved with the optimal debt or spread brake. However, for a Union of heterogeneous economies, a com-mon spread brake generates larger gains than a common debt brake. Furthermore, gains from abandoning a common debt brake may be significant for economies that are unnecessarily constrained by the rule. In contrast, abandoning a common spread brake would generate losses for any economy in the Union. (JEL E62, F34, F41, H61, H63)