Search, Screening, and SortingIndian Rupee

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cai, Xiaoming; Gautier, Pieter; Wolthoff, Ronald
• 署名单位: Peking University Shenzhen Graduate School (PKU Shenzhen); Peking University; University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; University of Toronto
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MACROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7707
• DOI: 10.1257/mac.20240026
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 205-236
• 关键词: Directed search; assignment; workers; MODEL

摘要

We examine how search frictions impact labor market sorting by constructing a model consistent with evidence that employers interview a subset of a pool of applicants. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for sorting in applications and matches. Positive sorting is obtained when production complementarities outweigh a counterforce measured by a (novel) quality-quantity elasticity. Interestingly, the threshold for the complementarities depends on the fraction of high-type workers and can be increasing in the number of interviews. Our model shows how policies like Ban the Box can backfire because when screening workers becomes harder, firms may discourage certain workers from applying.