Optimal Bank Reserve Remuneration and Capital Control Policy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chi, Chun-che; Schmitt-grohe, Stephanie; Uribe, Martin
• 署名单位: Academia Sinica - Taiwan; National Bureau of Economic Research; Columbia University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MACROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7707
• DOI: 10.1257/mac.20220324
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 203-244
• 关键词: Financial crises

摘要

A central prediction of open economy models with a pecuniary externality due to a collateral constraint is that the unregulated economy overborrows relative to what occurs under optimal policy. A maintained assumption in this literature is that households borrow directly from foreign lenders. This paper shows that if foreign lending is intermediated by domestic banks and the government can pay interest on bank reserves and impose capital controls, the unregulated economy underborrows. The optimal bank reserve policy is countercyclical. By increasing bank reserves during contractions, the government acts as a lender of last resort to collateral-constrained households. (JEL E32, E58, F38, F41, G21, G51)