The State-Dependent Effectiveness of Hiring Subsidies?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Graves, Sebastian
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MACROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7707
• DOI: 10.1257/mac.20200402
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 229-253
• 关键词: employment dynamics; cyclical behavior; indivisible labor; aggregate; INVESTMENT; COSTS; unemployment; turnover; GROWTH; models

摘要

The responsiveness of job creation to shocks is procyclical, while the responsiveness of job destruction is countercyclical. This new find-ing can be explained by a heterogeneous-firm model in which hiring costs lead to lumpy employment adjustment. The model predicts that policies that aim to stimulate employment by encouraging job cre-ation, such as hiring subsidies, are significantly less effective in reces-sions: these are times when few firms are near their hiring thresholds and many firms are near their firing thresholds. Policies that target the job destruction margin, such as employment protection subsidies, are particularly effective at such times. (JEL E24, E32, H25, J23, J64)