Rent Preservation and the Persistence of Underdevelopment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rajan, Raghuram G.
• 署名单位: University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MACROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7707
• DOI: 10.1257/mac.1.1.178
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 178-218
• 关键词: economic-development; institutions; INEQUALITY; POLITICS

摘要

When citizens in a poor constrained society are unequally endowed, they are likely to find it hard to agree on reforms, even though the status quo hurts them collectively. Each citizen group or constituency prefers reforms that expand its opportunities, but in an unequal society, this will typically hurt another constituency's rents. Competitive rent preservation ensures no comprehensive reform path may command broad support. The roots of underdevelopment may therefore lie in the natural tendency toward rent preservation in a divided society. (JEL D72, O10, O17)