State-Dependent Attention and Pricing Decisions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Turen, Javier
• 署名单位: Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MACROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7707
• DOI: 10.1257/mac.20210038
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 161-189
• 关键词: rational inattention; INFORMATION; expectations; volatility; DYNAMICS; prices; FIRMS

摘要

This paper studies price-setting decisions under rational inatten-tion. Prices are set by tracking an unobserved target whose distri-bution is also unknown. Information acquisition is dynamic and fully flexible since, given information acquired previously, price setters choose the amount of information they collect as well as how they want to learn about both the outcome and its distribu-tion. We show that by allowing for imperfect information to be the unique source of rigidity, the model can reconcile stylized facts in the microeconomic evidence on price setting while simultaneously being consistent with empirical results on state-dependent attention. (JEL D21, D82, D83, E32, L11, L25)