Central Bank Communication and Expectations Stabilization

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Eusepi, Stefano; Preston, Bruce
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York; Columbia University; Australian National University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MACROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7707
• DOI: 10.1257/mac.2.3.235
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 235-271
• 关键词: monetary-policy rules; social value; TRANSPARENCY; STABILITY; CONVERGENCE; credibility; performance; INFORMATION; Determinacy; inflation

摘要

The value of communication is analyzed in a model in which agents' expectations need not be consistent with central bank policy. Without communication, the Taylor principle is not sufficient for macroeconomic stability: divergent learning dynamics are possible. Three communication strategies are contemplated to ensure consistency between private forecasts and monetary policy strategy: communicating the precise details of policy; communicating only the variables on which policy decisions are conditioned; and communicating the inflation target. The former strategies restore the Taylor principle as a sufficient condition for anchoring expectations. The latter strategy, in general, fails to protect against expectations-driven fluctuations. (JEL E32, E43, E52, E58)