The Invisible Hand of the Government: Moral Suasion during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ongena, Steven; Popov, Alexander; Van Horen, Neeltje
• 署名单位: University of Zurich; KU Leuven; European Central Bank; Bank of England
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MACROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7707
• DOI: 10.1257/mac.20160377
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 346-379
• 关键词: politics; banks; OWNERSHIP; default; RISK

摘要

Using proprietary data on banks' monthly securities holdings, we show that during the European sovereign debt crisis, domestic banks in fiscally stressed countries were considerably more likely than foreign banks to increase their holdings of domestic sovereign bonds during months when the government needed to roll over a relatively large amount of maturing debt. This result cannot be explained by risk shifting, carry trading, or regulatory compliance. Domestic banks that received government support, are small, or with weaker balance sheets were particularly susceptible to moral suasion, while governance of banks played less of a role.