EQUILIBRIUM MECHANISMS IN A DECENTRALIZED MARKET
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
PETERS, M
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1994.1074
发表日期：
1994
页码：
390-423
关键词：
摘要：
A large decentralized market where buyers have private information about the idiosyncratic value of an exchange opportunity with a seller is studied. The seller offers the buyer a contract or mechanism as soon as he is matched. It is shown that if the discount factor is high enough, there will be a symmetric market equilibrium in which all sellers offer simple fixed price mechanisms. Along the equilibrium path these mechanisms will be ex ante inefficient. Prices will be too high and the extent of search by buyers too low. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.