LEARNING EQUILIBRIA
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
BULLARD, J
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1994.1077
发表日期：
1994
页码：
468-485
关键词：
摘要：
Complicated equilibrium trajectories under least squared learning are shown to exist in a standard version of the overlapping generations model. These trajectories exist when the locally unique perfect foresight equilibrium is the monetary steady state, and thus are induced by the introduction of learning alone. This research confirms the intuition of some previous authors, who have suggested that stationary equilibrium trajectories under learning may differ from those under rational expectations. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.