The number of active bidders in intemet auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: de Haan, Laurens; de Vries, Casper G.; Zhou, Chen
• 署名单位: Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Universidade de Lisboa; Chapman University System; Chapman University; European Central Bank; De Nederlandsche Bank NV
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.017
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 1726-1736
• 关键词: internet auctions; Number of active bidders; Record series

摘要

Internet auctions attract numerous agents, but only a few become active bidders. Under the Independent Private Values Paradigm the valuations of the active bidders form a specific record sequence. This record sequence implies that if the number n of potential bidders is large, the number of active bidders is approximately 2 log n, potentially explaining the relative inactivity. Moreover, if the arrival of potential bidders forms a non-homogeneous Poisson process due to a time preference for auctions that are soon to close, then the arrival process of the active bidders is approximately a Poisson arrival process. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.