Supplier relations and the market context: A theory of handshakes

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: McLaren, J
• 署名单位: Columbia University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(98)00037-3
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 121-138
• 关键词: Japan-US comparisons; cooperative innovation; Outsourcing

摘要

This paper analyzes the degree of formality in industrial procurement. Contracts impose cost discipline on suppliers, but stifle cooperative innovation; noncontractual procurement provides cooperation but poor cost discipline. However, cost discipline comes naturally when there is not much vertical integration, because the promise of finding an alternative buyer to use as a bargaining threat enhances the supplier's incentive to make efficiency-enhancing investments. Thus, highly integrated industries use contracts, while less integrated industries do business on handshakes. In the latter, cooperative innovations flourish. This may help explain some international comparisons and changes in business practices observed over time. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.