The negotiation of sustainable tariffs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Furusawa, T
• 署名单位: Yokohama National University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(98)00044-0
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 321-345
• 关键词: rubinstein bargaining model; tariff setting; repeated games

摘要

The governments of two countries explicitly negotiate over a new pair of tariffs. As soon as they reach agreement, the countries put into effect the agreed-upon pair of tariffs, which must be self-enforcing. We investigate how the difference in the two governments' patience affects the negotiation results. Provided that the common optimum tariff is the status quo tariff rate for each country, we find that the country with the more patient government gains most from the negotiation if the time lag between a defection and punishment in the implementation phase is short. The opposite is true if the response lag in the implementation phase is long. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science BN. All rights reserved.