Rent-shifting export subsidies with an imported intermediate product

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ishikawa, J; Spencer, BJ
• 署名单位: University of British Columbia; Hitotsubashi University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(98)00042-7
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 199-232
• 关键词: export subsidies; Strategic trade policy; vertically related markets; vertical oligopolies; Trade in intermediate goods

摘要

This paper examines the implications of foreign or domestic imperfect competition in intermediate-goods supply for strategic trade policy. Assuming Cournot competition, an export subsidy aimed at shifting rents from foreign to domestic final-good producers may also shift rents to foreign suppliers, weakening the incentive for the subsidy. However, the incentive for a subsidy tends to increase if the intermediate-good industry is purely domestic or if the industry is purely foreign, but the subsidy reduces the price of the imported input. Alternative rent-shifting policies (a production subsidy and an import tariff) applied to the input are also considered. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.