Optimal export policy in the presence of informational barriers to entry and imperfect competition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Raff, H; Kim, YH
• 署名单位: Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; Hankuk University Foreign Studies
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(98)00051-8
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 99-123
• 关键词: export policy; incomplete information; imperfect competition

摘要

This paper examines government intervention to help exporters overcome informational barriers to entry into foreign markets. Foreign consumers know the quality of a local good but not that of the imported substitute. An exporter who chooses high quality needs to signal this choice to foreign consumers via a high introductory price. Export policy affects both the signaling distortion and competition between exporter and incumbent. The signaling distortion may call for an export subsidy, competition for an export tax. Which policy is adopted in equilibrium depends on industry characteristics. Over time, the export tax tends to rise as the signaling distortion disappears. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.