Lobbying and international cooperation in tariff setting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Levy, PI
• 署名单位: Yale University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(98)00012-9
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 345-370
• 关键词: International trade; political economy; tariff determination

摘要

This paper develops a theory of tariff protection that incorporates cooperative behavior and lobbying. Governments use import tariffs or subsidies to maximize a weighted sum of lobbying contributions and general welfare. Governments do not use export taxes or subsidies and thus balance the interests of export and import-competing lobbies in setting tariff levels. In a symmetric model, cooperation between governments is sustained by threats of punishment in future periods. Unless governments place too much weight on the future, the result is a cooperative tariff. Otherwise, the result is a reciprocal import subsidy. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.