ALLOCATION OF INFORMATION BY MAJORITY DECISIONS
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
GERSBACH, H
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(92)90030-J
发表日期：
1992
页码：
259-268
关键词：
摘要：
In this paper, the allocation of information by a two-stage voting procedure is discussed. We define and analyze the value of public information in this framework. We show that the median voter for the decision on the project is also the median voter on the information decision. Moreover, a majority always prefer the public disclosure of information. From a utilitarian view, the average costs of the project and the tax burden of the informationally indifferent voter determines the social desirability of public information.
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