COMPETITIVE TAX THEORY IN OPEN ECONOMIES - CONSTRAINED INEFFICIENCY AND A PIGOVIAN REMEDY
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
KRELOVE, R
署名单位：
International Monetary Fund
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(92)90013-6
发表日期：
1992
页码：
361-375
关键词：
摘要：
In an economy with multiple governments, each is constrained to raise revenue for public expenditures using distortionary taxes on a directly mobile tax base. A government is said to be competitive if the total cost of its decisions, including the excess burden, is perceived to be internalized. The competitive equilibrium allocations are not constrained efficient in general: there is another set of distortionary taxes and associated public expenditures for which all individuals in the economy are better off. It is shown that the source of the failure can be interpreted as a missing market, and the form of the best decentralized remedy is derived.
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