PAY-AS-YOU-GO PUBLIC PENSIONS WITH ENDOGENOUS FERTILITY
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
NISHIMURA, K; ZHANG, JS
署名单位：
Western University (University of Western Ontario); Kyoto University; Australian National University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(92)90029-F
发表日期：
1992
页码：
239-258
关键词：
摘要：
Veall's (1986) model of public pensions is generalized to allow for endogenous fertility. We show that gifts to the old, which can be viewed as social security contributions, are always positive in the steady state. An optimal stationary allocation is sustainable if savings are zero and fertility is exogenous. However, the optimal allocation is in general not sustainable. In particular, if a government enforces a social security plan setting the pension level at the optimal gifts and individuals optimize under the pension constraint. the resulting sustainable outcome is in general different from either the optimal or Nash outcome.
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