REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY AND CAPITAL TAXATION
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
PERSSON, T; TABELLINI, G
署名单位：
University of Brescia; Stockholm University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(94)90080-9
发表日期：
1994
页码：
53-70
关键词：
摘要：
In this paper we study a political model of capital taxation. Voters who differ in their relative shares of capital and labor income choose tax policy under majority rule. We compare two political regimes: direct democracy, where the voters vote directly on the policy; and representative democracy, where they elect a representative who then chooses policy. In both regimes some form of commitment by the voters is necessary to avoid excessive taxation of capital. But the necessary commitment under representative democracy corresponds closely to that provided by the actual institutions of most democracies.
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