A REEXAMINATION OF THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP IN POLITICS
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
BENDER, B
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(94)90018-3
发表日期：
1994
页码：
149-163
关键词：
摘要：
That senators from the same state often have a large difference in their ideological voting records has proven inconvenient for a literature that has largely relied on a median voter model of elections. One exception is Palfrey (Review of Economic Studies, 1984, 51, 139-156), whose analysis implies the hypothesis that the expected difference in such voting records varies directly with the variance of that state's density function of constituent ideological preferences. This paper provides empirical testing consistent with this hypothesis. The paper then argues that currently accepted methodology for measuring senatorial shirking is systematically biased towards indicating shirking and provides empirical analysis consistent with this argument.
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