AN EXPLANATION FOR WHY SENATORS FROM THE SAME STATE VOTE DIFFERENTLY SO FREQUENTLY
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
JUNG, GR; KENNY, LW; LOTT, JR
署名单位：
University of Pennsylvania; State University System of Florida; University of Florida
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(94)90071-X
发表日期：
1994
页码：
65-96
关键词：
摘要：
This paper explains why rational, well-informed voters elect politicians with divergent platforms. Given well-defined constituencies and the costliness of any individual politician creating transfers across all interest groups, we show that different politicians from the same district can successfully represent vastly different constituencies and still have each politician producing the support-maximizing level of transfers. Our explanation focuses on how obtaining wealth transfers reduces successful constituencies' returns to obtaining additional transfers. The evidence strongly rejects alternative explanations based upon the median voter and 'polarized policy preference' approaches.
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