A PARETO COMPARISON OF AD-VALOREM AND UNIT TAXES IN NONCOMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENTS
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
SKEATH, SE; TRANDEL, GA
署名单位：
University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(94)90013-2
发表日期：
1994
页码：
53-71
关键词：
摘要：
A literature that began with Wicksell (1896) has shown that an ad valorem tax is welfare superior to an equal-yield unit tax in both monopoly and oligopoly markets. This paper proves a stronger result: for any unit tax imposed on a monopoly, there exists an ad valorem tax that Pareto dominates it - that produces larger profit, tax revenue, and consumer surplus. The paper then considers whether this Pareto result generalizes to all Cournot-Nash oligopolies. The paper shows that Pareto dominance holds in such markets whenever the tax level exceeds a critical value that depends on various market parameters.
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