DESIGNING A PRIVATE INDUSTRY - GOVERNMENT AUCTIONS WITH ENDOGENOUS MARKET-STRUCTURE
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
DANA, JD; SPIER, KE
署名单位：
Harvard University; Dartmouth College
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(94)90017-5
发表日期：
1994
页码：
127-147
关键词：
摘要：
This paper considers government mechanisms for auctioning production rights in which both the winners and the market structure, duopoly (dual-sourcing), monopoly (sole-sourcing), or government-owned production, are a function of the bids. In designing the optimal mechanism, the government considers the tradeoffs among consumer surplus, producer surplus, and revenue. Under incomplete information, duopoly is implemented less frequently, and government production more frequently, than under complete information. When bidders are symmetric, the optimal mechanism can be implemented as a modified second-price auction. Applications to privatization, deregulation, and defense procurement are discussed.
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