Political structure, taxes, and trade

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Karni, E; Chakrabarti, SK
• 署名单位: Purdue University System; Purdue University; Purdue University in Indianapolis
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(96)01614-3
• 发表日期: 1997
• 页码: 241-258
• 关键词: chain of markets; taxes; TRADE

摘要

This paper examines the effects of the political organization of a chain of markets on the level of taxes and the volume of trade. Using a game-theoretic approach we note that, under certain demand structures, noncooperative tax policies implemented by independent jurisdictions entail externalities detrimental to trade. We show that the monopolization of the chain of markets (or the implementation of cooperative tax strategies), by internalizing the costs associated with these externalities, increases the volume of trade and the tax revenues simultaneously.