Bidding for a group-specific public-good prize

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Baik, KH; Kim, IG; Na, SY
• 署名单位: Hallym University; Hallym University; Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU); Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00139-0
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 415-429
• 关键词: public-good prize; Contest; all-pay auction; private provision of public goods

摘要

We examine the equilibrium effort levels of individual players and groups in a contest in which two groups compete with each other to win a group-specific public-good prize, the players choose their effort levels simultaneously and independently, and the winning group is determined by the selection rule of all-pay auctions. We first prove nonexistence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, and then construct a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. At the Nash equilibrium, the only active player in each group is a player whose valuation for the prize is the highest in that group; all the other players expend zero effort; and the equilibrium effort levels depend solely on two values - the highest valuation for the prize in each group. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science BY. All rights reserved.