Environmental controls, scarcity rents, and pre-existing distortions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fullerton, D; Metcalf, GE
• 署名单位: Tufts University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00087-6
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 249-267
• 关键词: emissions tax; scarcity rents; command and control regulations

摘要

One might suppose that an emissions tax has an advantage over command and control (CAC) regulations since it raises revenue that can be used to cut other distorting taxes. In this paper, we show that the focus on revenue raising is misplaced. In a simple analytical general equilibrium model, we show that the same welfare effects of environmental protection can be achieved, by taxes that raise revenue, certain command and control regulations that raise no revenue, and oven subsidies that cost revenue. Instead, the pre-existing labor tax distortion is exacerbated by policies that generate privately-retained scarcity rents. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.