Can by-product lobbying firms compete?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pecorino, P
• 署名单位: University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00154-7
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 377-397
• 关键词: by-product lobbying; free-rider problem; collective action

摘要

Olson (1965) argues that some large groups can overcome the free-rider problem through by-product lobbying. The by-product firm sells a private good to potential members of the interest group and finances lobbying with its profits. Others argue that by-product lobbying firms cannot survive competition with for-profit firms, since this would compete away monopoly rents, leaving the firm unable to lobby. In a model of monopolistic competition, I show that the by-product firm can enter the market and earn enough profits to exceed the noncooperative level of lobbying. This is true despite the free entry of for-profit firms. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science BY All rights reserved.