Capital income taxation, wealth distribution and borrowing constraints

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Chamley, C
• 署名单位: Boston University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00095-5
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 55-69
• 关键词: capital income taxation; wealth distribution; Pareto efficient tax reform; borrowing constraints

摘要

The theorem of zero taxation of capital income is reexamined and is shown to hinge critically on the assumptions of a long horizon and perfect markets for the inter-temporal allocation of resources. The theorem does not hold when borrowing constraints prevent individuals from insuring against idiosyncratic shocks and have a precautionary motive for savings. Structural assumptions are made such that with no taxation, aggregate savings are socially 'excessive' in the long-run, i.e. the rate of return is smaller than the discount rate. Sufficient conditions for a Pareto efficient taxation or subsidization of capital in the long-run depend on the correlation between individuals' consumption and savings. A subsidy may be efficient when individuals' incomes follow a predictable pattern of life-cycles with no negative bequest. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.