Emission taxes and optimal refunding schemes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gersbach, H; Requate, T
• 署名单位: University of Kiel; Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00215-3
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 713-725
• 关键词: emission taxes; refunds

摘要

We examine how refunding emission taxes to firms dependent on market shares should be designed. While refunding is harmful under perfect competition, a first-best self-financing tax/tax-refunding scheme exists if the marginal damage from pollution exceeds the marginal distortion in an imperfectly competitive output market with symmetric firms. Under pre-investment in cleaner technology with short-term abatement opportunities, a first-best refunding scheme exists if pollution refunding can be made dependent on both market and investment shares. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.