On atmosphere externality and corrective taxes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sheshinski, E
• 署名单位: Hebrew University of Jerusalem
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00224-4
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 727-734
• 关键词: atmosphere externality; optimal taxation; distributional considerations

摘要

It has been argued that in the presence of an 'Atmosphere Externality' and competitive behavior by households, a uniform commodity tax on the extemality-generating good attains the first best. It is demonstrated, however, that if income redistribution is desirable then personalized taxes are required for a second-best optimum. Each of these taxes is the sum of a uniform (across households) tax and a component, positive or negative, which depends on the household's income and demand elasticities. Second-best optimal indirect taxes and rules for investment in extemality-reducing measures are also considered. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.