Competition, incentives, and public school productivity

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: McMillan, R
• 署名单位: University of Toronto
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2003.06.003
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 1871-1892
• 关键词: competition; incentives; PRODUCTIVITY; voucher; targeting

摘要

When competition increases, it is often presumed that public schools will be forced to become more efficient. This paper challenges that presumption, showing that in well-defined circumstances, rent-seeking public schools find it optimal to reduce productivity when a voucher is introduced. This occurs for incentive reasons alone. More generally, the productivity effects of vouchers are shown to be non-uniform, varying systematically according to the distribution of households and the form the voucher takes; when the voucher is targeted, perverse productivity outcomes do not arise. The analysis has relevance to the policy issue of voucher design. (C) 2003 Published by Elsevier B.V.