Nonprofits with distributional objectives: price discrimination and corner solutions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Steinberg, R; Weisbrod, BA
• 署名单位: Purdue University System; Purdue University; Purdue University in Indianapolis; Northwestern University; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.08.006
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 2205-2230
• 关键词: nonprofit organization; price discrimination; distributional weights; public pricing

摘要

We characterize the patterns of pricing and rationing when paternalistic nonprofit organizations (either private or governmental) care about the level and distribution of consumer surplus provided to their clients. Equilibrium depends upon marginal cost, the organization's distributional weights, exogenous income levels, and cream-skimming by competing for-profit firms. In equilibrium, some consumers pay their reservation price or a lower price above marginal cost, some pay less than marginal cost, some obtain the good for free, and some are not permitted to buy the good at any acceptable price. Comparative statics here differs from that for output or profit maximizers, with discontinuous price schedules shifting abruptly when exogenous income changes. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.