Perverse committee appointments may foster divide and rule

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Seidmann, Daniel J.
• 署名单位: University of Nottingham
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.05.009
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 448-455
• 关键词: committee voting; divide and rule; coalition proofness

摘要

A plurality-rule spatial committee can select an extreme decision if a bare minority of members prefer the opposite extreme decision: the majority who prefer a moderate decision are immobilised by internal divisions. Consequently, a nominator may appoint candidates with the opposite preference ordering so as to build up the bare minority. Our results may explain why Disraeli extended the franchise to skilled male workers in 1867 against centrist opposition; and why an electorate whose preferences are not polarized may have to choose between extremist candidates. (c) 2007 Published by Elsevier B.V.