One Man, One Dollar'? Campaign contribution limits, equal influence, and political communication

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Vanberg, Christoph
• 署名单位: Max Planck Society
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.05.010
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 514-531
• 关键词: Elections; campaign finance; EQUALITY; Advertising; signaling

摘要

Arguably the most important campaign finance regulations in U.S. federal elections are limits imposed on individual campaign contributions. One of the principal arguments in support of these contribution limits has been that they equalize the influence of individual donors and thereby cause candidates' aggregate financial resources to more accurately reflect public support. I construct a formal model to evaluate this argument. The analysis shows that a necessary condition for it to apply is that a candidate's reliance on large contributions is negatively related to voter-preferred characteristics which cannot be credibly revealed through campaign advertisements. Using data on elections to the House of Representatives between 1992 and 2000, I find no evidence that such a relationship exists. This result casts doubt on the equalization argument in support of campaign contribution limits. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.