Interest groups and the electoral control of politicians

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Snyder, James M., Jr.; Ting, Michael M.
• 署名单位: Columbia University; Columbia University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.12.009
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 482-500
• 关键词: Elections; interest groups; term limits; vote buying; Political agency

摘要

We develop a model of interest group influence in the presence of repeated electoral competition. In each period of the game, an interest group attempts to buy an incumbent's policy choice, and a voter chooses whether to replace the incumbent with an unknown challenger. The voter faces a tension between retaining good politician types and rewarding past performance. The model predicts that above average incumbents face little discipline, but others are disciplined increasingly - and re-elected at a higher rate - as the interest group becomes more extreme. Extensions of the model consider term limits, long-lived groups, and multiple groups. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.