Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Kamei, Kenju
• 署名单位: Brown University; University of Vienna; University of Copenhagen
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.05.001
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 1213-1222
• 关键词: public good; voluntary contribution; Formal sanction; experiment; Penalty; voting

摘要

The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support the provision of public goods has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable of either resolving or exacerbating the free-rider problem, depending on parameter settings. Most groups quickly learned to choose parameters inducing efficient outcomes. We find that cooperative orientation, political attitude, gender and intelligence have a small but sometimes significant influence on voting. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.