The price of pork: The seniority trap in the US House

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: DeBacker, Jason
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.09.007
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 63-78
• 关键词: Pork barrel; Seniority system; incumbency advantage; House of Representatives; term limits

摘要

Using data on federal outlays and U.S. House elections,! estimate the effect of the pork barrel on the quality of officeholders, taking into account the fact that seniority creates a dynamic linkage across periods. After estimating the parameters governing the influence of seniority on federal outlays and the parameters governing the distributions of candidate quality, I conduct several policy experiments to uncover the size of the welfare loss created by the seniority system. I find that the seniority system negatively impacts the quality of representatives, but has little effect on the outcomes of elections. Furthermore, the most commonly proposed solution to the distortion, term limits, may have a significant, negative effect on the quality of sitting representatives. Instead of a quantity constraint (term limits), I propose a change in the relative price of seniority by way of a Pigouvian tax on seniority. Such a policy achieves the first-best outcome. Published by Elsevier B.V.