Privatization and labor policies

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Chong, Alberto; Guillen, Jorge; Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio
• 署名单位: Inter-American Development Bank; George Washington University; Universite Catholique de Lille; EDHEC Business School
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.05.014
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 1119-1130
• 关键词: Privatization; prices; Downsizing; LABOR; adverse selection; Re-hiring

摘要

Using new data we analyze retrenchment programs before privatization, their effect on prices paid and rehiring policies pursued by the new private owners. We find evidence in support of skimming and adverse selection. We find that some labor retrenchment policies have a negative impact on net privatization prices, even after taking sample selection bias and endogeneity into account. Some downsizing policies may lead to a higher frequency of post-privatization re-hiring. Skill-biased retrenchment programs are the only ones marginally associated with higher privatization prices and minimal re-hiring rates after privatization. But the political and economic costs of such programs may make them impractical. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.