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作者：Broner, Fernando A.; Martin, Alberto; Ventura, Jaume
摘要：There is a large and growing literature that studies the effects of weak enforcement institutions on economic performance. This literature has focused almost exclusively on primary markets, in which assets are issued and traded to improve the allocation of investment and consumption. The general conclusion is that weak enforcement institutions impair the workings of these markets, giving rise to various inefficiencies. But weak enforcement institutions also create incentives to develop seconda...
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作者：Rios-Rull, Jose-Victor; Sanchez-Marcos, Virginia
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Universidad de Cantabria
摘要：We build an aggregate model with different size houses and liquid assets. Typical households are born, are subject to idiosyncratic earnings risk, and save for both life-cycle reasons and housing reasons. Typically, a subset of these households, after accumulating some assets, make a down payment and buy a small starter's house or flat. As time passes, some households upgrade to a larger and nicer house. Households with houses may also eventually downgrade to a flat or even to no house and fla...
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作者：Pettersson-Lidbom, Per
作者单位：Stockholm University
摘要：A long-standing issue in political economics is to what extent party control makes a difference in determining fiscal and economics policies. This question is very difficult to answer empirically because parties are not randomly selected to govern political entities. This article uses a regression-discontinuity design, namely, party control changes discontinuously at 50% of the vote share, which can produce near experimental causal estimates of the effect of party control on economic outcomes....
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作者：Roberson, Brian
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Miami University
摘要：This article utilizes a simple model of redistributive politics with jurisdictional specific local projects to analyze the inefficiencies that arise under differing levels of targetability in both taxes/transfers and local projects. The ability to tactically target taxes/transfers and/or local projects leads political parties to engage in pandering to favored groups. However, in equilibrium, we find that greater targetability in the set of available policies actually intensifies the competitio...
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作者：Drelichman, Mauricio; Voth, Hans-Joachim
作者单位：University of British Columbia
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作者：Tabellini, Guido
作者单位：Bocconi University
摘要：How and why does distant political and economic history shape the functioning of current institutions? This paper argues that individual values and convictions about the scope of application of norms of good conduct provide the missing link. Evidence from a variety of sources points to two main findings. First, individual values consistent with generalized (as opposed to limited) morality are widespread in societies that were ruled by non-despotic political institutions in the distant past. Se...
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作者：Elliott, Graham; Timmermann, Allan; Komunjer, Ivana
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：Empirical studies using survey data on expectations have frequently observed that forecasts are biased and have concluded that agents are not rational. We establish that existing rationality tests are not robust to even small deviations from symmetric loss and hence have little ability to tell whether the forecaster is irrational or the loss function is asymmetric. We quantify the trade-off between forecast inefficiency and asymmetric loss leading to identical outcomes of standard rationality ...
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作者：Corsetti, Giancarlo; Mueller, Gernot J.
作者单位：European University Institute; Roma Tre University; Goethe University Frankfurt
摘要：In this article, we study. the co-movement of the government budget balance and the trade balance at business-cycle frequencies. In a sample of 10 OECD countries we find that the correlation of the two time series is negative, but less so in more open economies. Moreover, for the U.S. the cross-correlation function is S-shaped. We analyze these regularities taking the perspective of international business cycle theory. First, we show that a standard model delivers predictions broadly in line w...
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作者：Guiso, Luigi; Sapienza, Paola; Zingales, Luigi
作者单位：European University Institute; University of Chicago; Northwestern University
摘要：To explain the extremely long-term persistence (more than 500 years) of positive historical experiences of cooperation (Putnam 1993), we model the intergenerational transmission of priors about the trustworthiness of others. We show that this transmission tends to be biased toward excessively conservative priors. As a result, societies can be trapped in a low-trust equilibrium. In this context, a temporary shock to the return to trusting can have a permanent effect on the level of trust. We va...
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作者：Kocherlakota, Narayana; Pistaferri, Luigi
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; Stanford University
摘要：Kocherlakota and Pistaferri (2007) describe two different. models (Private Information Pareto Optimal and Incomplete Markets) of how households partially insure themselves against idiosyncratic shocks. They demonstrate that the models differ in terms of their implications for real exchange rates. In this paper, we use data from a wide range of countries, and document that there is a statististically significant relationship between real exchange rate growth and between-country differences in t...
