Pork-barrel politics, targetable policies, and fiscal federalism

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Roberson, Brian
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; Miami University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1162/JEEA.2008.6.4.819
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 819-844
• 关键词: electoral competition; distributive politics; redistributive politics; economic-theories; colonel-blotto; public-goods; NATIONS; incentives; EFFICIENCY; provision

摘要

This article utilizes a simple model of redistributive politics with jurisdictional specific local projects to analyze the inefficiencies that arise under differing levels of targetability in both taxes/transfers and local projects. The ability to tactically target taxes/transfers and/or local projects leads political parties to engage in pandering to favored groups. However, in equilibrium, we find that greater targetability in the set of available policies actually intensifies the competition between the political parties and so increases efficiency in the provision of local projects.