Enforcement problems and secondary markets
成果类型：
Article; Proceedings Paper
署名作者：
Broner, Fernando A.; Martin, Alberto; Ventura, Jaume
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
ISSN/ISSBN：
1542-4766
DOI：
10.1162/JEEA.2008.6.2-3.683
发表日期：
2008
页码：
683-694
关键词：
摘要：
There is a large and growing literature that studies the effects of weak enforcement institutions on economic performance. This literature has focused almost exclusively on primary markets, in which assets are issued and traded to improve the allocation of investment and consumption. The general conclusion is that weak enforcement institutions impair the workings of these markets, giving rise to various inefficiencies. But weak enforcement institutions also create incentives to develop secondary markets, in which the assets issued in primary markets are retraded. This article shows that trading in secondary markets counteracts the effects of weak enforcement institutions and, in the absence of further frictions, restores efficiency.
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