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作者：Bartling, Bjoern; Schmidt, Klaus M.
作者单位：University of Zurich; University of Munich
摘要：How does an ex-ante contract affect behavior in an ex-post renegotiation game? We address this question in a canonical buyer-seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a highly significant and economically important impact on renegotiation behavior that goes beyond the effect of contracts on bargaining threat points. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to strategically equivalent bargaining...
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作者：Fehr, Ernst; Hart, Oliver; Zehnder, Christian
作者单位：University of Zurich; Harvard University; University of Lausanne
摘要：The notion of contracts as reference points provides the basis for a deeper understanding of important phenomena such as the employment contract, vertical integration, firm scope, authority, and delegation. Previous experiments lend support to this notion but they ignore realistic aspects of trading relationships such as informal agreements and ex-post renegotiation or revision. Here we show that the central behavioral mechanism underlying contractual reference points is robust to such conside...
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作者：Spinnewijn, Johannes
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper analyzes how biased beliefs about employment prospects affect the optimal design of unemployment insurance. Empirically, I find that the unemployed greatly overestimate how quickly they will find work. As a consequence, they would search too little for work, save too little for unemployment and deplete their savings too rapidly when unemployed. I analyze the use of the sufficient-statistics formula to characterize the optimal unemployment policy when beliefs are biased and revisit t...
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作者：Mason, Robin; Valimaki, Juuso
作者单位：University of Exeter; Aalto University
摘要：A principal wants an agent to complete a project. The agent undertakes unobservable effort, which affects in each period the probability that the project is completed. We characterize the contracts that the principal sets, with and without commitment. With full commitment, the contract involves the agent's value and wage declining over time, in order to give the agent incentives to exert effort. The best sequentially rational equilibrium for the principal also involves the agent's wage declini...
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作者：di Giovanni, Julian; Levchenko, Andrei A.; Ortega, Francesc
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; City University of New York (CUNY) System; Queens College NY (CUNY)
摘要：This paper evaluates the global welfare impact of observed levels of migration using a quantitative multi-sector model of the world economy calibrated to aggregate and firm-level data. Our framework features cross-country labor productivity differences, international trade, remittances, and a heterogeneous workforce. We compare welfare under the observed levels of migration to a no-migration counterfactual. In the long run, natives in countries that received a lot of migrationsuch as Canada or...
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作者：Gentzkow, Matthew; Petek, Nathan; Shapiro, Jesse M.; Sinkinson, Michael
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Using data from 1869 to 1928, we estimate the effect of party control of state governments on the entry, exit, circulation, prices, number of pages, and content of Republican and Democratic daily newspapers. We exploit changes over time in party control of the governorship and state legislatures in a differences-in-differences design. We exploit close gubernatorial elections and state legislatures with small majorities in a parallel regression-discontinuity design. Neither method reveals evide...
